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Abstract This article first dcscribes trends of a few key data on 
public opinion on national security in West Germany since 1970, 
and then examines in some detail the development and structurc 
of public attitudes on NATO's double-track decision and its im-
plementation in the early t980s. lt addrcsses the problems of 
measuring such attitudes and interpreting relevant public opinion 
data in the light of levcls of public awareness and of the personal 
importancc of these matters for respondents. In that context, the 
results of some methodological cxperiments to ascertain the im-
pact of question formats and wordings on rcsponse distributions 
for defensc policy survcy items are also presented. Generational 
replacement and partisan polarization hypotheses to account for 
the dynamics of these attitudes arc compared. The main finding 
here is that growing dissent among thc major parties over missile 
dcployment has playcd a much greater role in rcaligning public 
opinion than has the coming of age of a prcdominantly antinuclear 
and antidefense "successor generation." 
One of thc most ambiguous, imprecisc and elusive aspects of security [is) 
that of thc domestic factors inftuencing defense policies, doctrines and 
burdens. This . . . subject has senerally been unexplored in traditional 
strategic studics .... As long as domestic consensus on these matters 
existed, there was no real pressure to address them; that idyllic state of 
atrairs no longer exists. An important part of the public in our societies is 
no longer willing to trust govemmcnts or experts or even the mcdia on 
matters of defense policy. (Bertram, 1983: 1) 
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lntroduction 
Political scientists in the United States have long realized the impor-
tance of public opinion on foreign policy and national security (sec, 
e.g., Rosenau, J 961; Russett and Stepan, J 973). In the FederaJ Re-
public, on the other hand, there has been little comparable scholarly 
research for a variety of reasons: First, mass protest against West 
Gennan rearmament, against its possible nuclear component, and 
against NATO membership was a transient phenomenon that occurred 
during a period when the course of the country's postwar foreign pol-
icy still had tobe defined and consolidated. Second, national security 
concems ranked low in public political priorities and debates in the 
1960s and 1970s. This statement is not contradicted by the public atten-
tion that "Ostpolitik" received after the SPD-FDP govemment came 
to power in 1969, because this attention mainly consisted of wide-
spread support for the new coalition's goals, and because the national 
security context of „Ostpolitik" never played a major role. Third, 
national security debates in the Federal Republic have largely been 
restricted to the elite level, and even there they have predominantly 
been reftective of technological and/or doctrinal innovations originat-
ing from the United States. Up to the late 1970s the almost complete 
absence of a national security nonelite "issue public" in West Ger· 
many was often lamented, so it is not surprising that public opinion on 
these issues was rarely polled or analyzed systematically. 
According to the above quotation, this „idyllic state of affairs" is 
gone, the paradise of popular national security consensus "in our soci-
eties' • has been lost. Like many similar assertions that could be heard 
in the past couple ofyears, this refers to many West European nations, 
not only the Federal Republic. Most such statements proceed from the 
extent and intensity of protest against NATO's December 1979 double-
track decision to negotiate with the USSR about nuclear weapons in 
Europe and to introduce new American systems (Pershing II and cruise 
missiles) should these negotiations fail to produce substantial Eastem 
reductions, and against subsequent preparations for deployment of 
intennediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe. This protest 
was taken by many observers as an indication of radical change that, 
depending upon ideological predilections, was interpreted either as a 
long overdue democratization of defense policy or as a dangerous ero-
sion of its societal foundations. 
Regardless of such divergent interpretations, the alleged „revolt of 
the masses" of the early 1980s made national security analysts in many 
countries "discover" public opinion and survey research, formerly not 
central to their attention, and it made pollsters aware of the market for 
such data. As a consequence of this rediscovery of "linkage politics „ 
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(Rosenau, 1969), the war of words over the double-track decision and 
its implementation was not only fought with the public's response in 
mind, but also with key arguments beiog drawn from its purported 
preferences, and even about what these preferences really looked like. 
In this process of discovering public opinion and survey methodol-
ogy many defense policy experts and decision makers also borrowed 
an explanatory paradigm already well established in political sociol-
ogy, i.e .• generational replacement (see, e.g., lnglehart, 1977). This 
explanation holds that public mobilii.ation over national security issues 
away from established policies is due to the coming of age of new 
cohorts that Jack the historical experiences and values that have 
shaped the design and goals of postwar Western efforts to provide 
peace and security. This "successor generation" hypothesis, by the 
way, is equally popular with those who view the developments of 
recent years with concern as with those who express their sympathies 
(see, e.g., Si.abo, 1983, 1984; Mushaben, 1984). 
Preoccupied (as they mostly have to be) with political matters of the 
day, many decision makers and national security experts approach 
relevant public opinion data in a style which sometimes appears rather 
breathless. Chasing after the most recent polling results (that hopefully 
fit one's own views) is often preferred over detached and systematic 
evaluation and analysis. From their point of view, attitudes on INF 
deployment, for example, are probably yesterday's news, since this 
process has already been going on now for quite some time without 
massive civil unrest. What would count today for them is data on 
public reactions to SDI, analogous European schemes, the Reykjavik 
summit, etc. · 
In this report on public attitudes on national security atTairs in West 
Germany in the early 1980s, no effort will be made to satisfy such 
craving for the most up-to-date information. lnstead, an attempt will be 
made to put the data available about the experience with the double-
track decision and with INF into perspective. looking for lessons tobe 
learned and for answers to a few general but basic questions. These 
questions are as follows: First, is there really evidence of the asserted 
radical changes in mass opinion on national security since the double-
track decision was taken? Second, is it true, as the "successor genera-
tion" hypothesis posits, that such attitudes are more clcarly polarized 
along generational divides than along most other social and political 
cleavagcs? Third, to what extent is it possible to describe survey re-
sponses on these matters as genuine opinions, i.e., stable attitudes 
based upon information and experience, that could even be defended 
against dissenting opinions or counterevidence? 
In the following three sections we will, therefore, first havc a look at 
a few trends of public attitudes on national security sincc 1970. In the 
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second step the polarization of such opinions in the early 1980s along 
generational lines will be compared to that along partisan lines. Finally, 
the sensitivity of survey responses on the doubJe-track decision and on 
INF deployment in Western Europe vis-a-vis variations of question 
wording will be demonstrated. In that context, we will also summarize 
data about the level of the public's information on these matters and 
will present results from experiments designed to inftuence responses 
on defense policy survey items by question formats and wordings. This 
is the only part where our own data will be used; otherwise this article 
relies on secondary analysis of data compiled from a multitude of 
sources for reports published elsewhere (Rattinger, 1985; Rattinger and 
HeinJein, 1986). 1 
Some Trends 1970-1984 
In order to obtain a meaningful evaluation of the extent of changes in 
public opinion on defense policy in the earJy 1980s it is mandatory to 
have comparisons with earJier periods. If what has been said above 
regarding the discovery of this aspect of popular attitudes in the wake 
of the double-track decision is true, the scope for such comparisons 
obviously has tobe lirnited. Prior to 1979 there was much less incentive 
to do this kind of polling, and what earJier data is available naturally 
does not refer to the subject matter of the more recent controversies. 
An abundance of up-to-date infonnation on very detailed and specific 
aspects of defense-related attitudes stands in stark contrast to the rela-
tive paucity of comparable earlier findings that, moreover, mainly 
cover only broader orientations toward national security. Neverthe-
less, the longitudinal comparisons that can be made offer some useful 
insights. 
In the past half decade one could often hear the argument that the 
surge of peace movement activities indicated a rapidly growing con-
cem within the German population over the stability of peace. Figure l 
shows evaluations of the importance of economic problems and of the 
preservation of peace as political tasks for the Federal Republic from 
1970 to 1984.2 The difference in the order of magnitude of nominations 
1. All Figures and Tablcs 1-3 of this article summarizc findings from a largc number of 
surveys taken by a variety of polling institutes. Without exception, thcse surveys were 
nationwidc and among Gcnnan nationals of vot.ing a&c (i.e., 18 ycars and older). Num-
bers of rcspondcnts usually rangc from 1500 to 2000~ occasionalty sample sizc is only 
about 1000 to 1200. To maintain readability, completc question wordings are omitted 
from Table 1, and for thc time scrics in Figures 1-4 there is no list of what institute 
supplicd data for which years. This is fully documented in Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986, 
from which these tablcs and figurcs arc condensed. Copies of thesc tables or of the 
underlying original reports by the survey research institutes will bc supplied on requcst 
by the author. 
2. The trend lines in Figures 1-4 have bccn computed by simple bivariate regression. For 
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Flpare 1. Attitudes on the lmportance of Peace and of Economic 
lssues, 1970-1984. 
Peruntaaes of total responses for ptoct on the one hand and tconomic usuts (i.e., 
unemployment, inftation, and economic growth) on the other hand to the question "In 
your opinion, what are currentJy the most important political problems for tbe FederaJ 
Republic?" Multiple responses (up to lhree) were allowed. Sourct: Rattinaer and Hein-
lein, 1986: table 1; dala from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen in Mannheim (fGW), Institut 
fOr Demoskopie in Allensbach (lfO), SozialwissenschaftJiches Fonchun1sinstitut der 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftu111 in Sankt Augustin (SFK), Zentralarchiv fnr empirische 
Sozialfonchuna in Coloane (ZA). 
for the two policy arenas speaks for itself. Considering that with open-
ended qucstions of this sort a respondent on the average names about 
2.S political problems, it is obvious that each respondent is expected to 
name at least one economic problem, whereas the share of people 
volunteering the preservation of peace as a political problem for the 
Federal Republic never much exceeded 20%, usually even being much 
lower. That the overall percentage of nominations for ''peace'' from 
1980 to 1983 increased from 3% to 10% is not really surprising and by 
no means resembles radical change; similar values could already be 
observed in the early 1970s. Moreover, in 1984 this share was already 
declining again. lf one wants to know what a quick and strong redefini-
computina peruntaaes for Fiaures 2, 3, and 4, „don't know," "undecided," and refus-
als were omitted. Mean values 1970-1984 are as rollows: lmponance Peace, S; lmpor-
tance Economics, .S3; Wanaw Pact Stronger, 42; Military Threat, S2; Favor U.S. Wilh-
drawal, 25; German NATO Membenhip, 61; Defense Possible, 49; Bundeswehr (very) 
lmponant, 74. 
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tion of popular priorities looks like, one can find it, instead, in the 
uimportance of economics" curve that within two years soared from 
below SO% to weil above 70% of overall responses when recession 
began to hit the Federal Republic in the wake of the increase of oil 
prices foUowing the 1973 Middle East war. 
During the debate over the double-track decision and its implemen-
tation it was also often asserted that one of the crucial changes in 
Western publics' attitudes was an increasing failure to recognize the 
Soviet military buildup and its consequences. Figure 2 demonstrates 
that this is somewhat of an overstatement for the West Gerrnan popula-
tion at large. Starting at under 30% in the early 1970s, the share of 
people perceiving Eastem military superiority has been oscillating be-
tween 40% and slightly above 50% since 1975, no systematic decline 
since 1980 being recognizable. Similarly, perceptions of a military 
threat emanating from the Eastem bloc, following a steady increase 
from 1970 to 1976 from below 40% to weil above 50%, have since then 
fluctuated around 50%. The peak of 1980 most likely is reflective of the 
Soviel invasion of Afghanistan and maybe ofthe lranian hostage crisis. 
Again, the data for the early 1980s indicate no reversal into a down-
ward trend. 
A third diagnosis frequently advanced within the framework of the 
"successor generation" hypothesis is that of pacifism, neutralism, and 
anti-Americanism spreading quickly in West Gerrnany. Again, the de-
velopment of mass opinion depicted in Figure 3 does not reaUy support 
this diagnosis. ApprovaJ of Gerrnan membership in NATO has in-
creased rather consistently, reaching peak, and not minimum, values in 
the 1980s. In fact, support for NATO membership in the 19.50s and 
1960s usually was even lower than in the early 1970s, so that there has 
been a continuous upward trend for about three decades. The percent-
age of people favoring withdrawal of U .S. troops from Europe, on the 
other band, declined over the 1970s. From 1980 through 1982 this 
demand again became somewhat more popular, but the level of the 
earlier 1970s was not reached, and the reversal ofthe trend did not last. 
Figure 4, finalf y, shows popular evaluations of the importance of the 
Bundeswehr (FederaJ Armed Forces) for the Federal Republic and of 
the chances that the country could be defended militarily in case of 
aggression. The latter time series, again, exhibits no significant shift 
since the onset of the new defense debates. The fact that only about 
one-half of those who respond to such survey items believe in the 
possibility of successful military defense certainly reftects a consider-
abJe degree of skepticism, but that is not at all a novel phenomenon. 
Evaluations of the Bundeswehr as ''important'' or ''very important'' 
for the country are comparatively easy to make as long as such ques-
tions do not require trade-offs or ranking institutions as to their impor-
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Flpare 2. Attitudes on the Military Balance and the Military 
Threat, 1970-1984. 
Warsaw Pact Stronger: Percentage replying „Warsaw Pacf' or the "East" to the 
question "Who do you think is currentJy superior in military terms, NATO or thc 
Eastem bloc, the Wanaw Pact, or arc both equally strong?" So11rce: Rattinger and 
Heinlein, 1986: table 4; data from EMNIO.lnstitut in Bielefeld (EMNID), FGW, lfD, 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr in Munich (SOWJ). 
Military Thuat: Percentqe ind.icating perceplions of threat in response to the ques-
tion "What do you think, is the Federal Republic cum:ntly being threatened militarily 
by the East or not?" Source: Raninacr and Heinlein, 1986: table 6; data from FGW, 
lfD, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut Nowak und Sörgel in Munich (SINUS), SOWI. 
tance. The data in Figure 4, therefore, should not necessarily be read 
as reftecting great enthusiasm about the armed forces. What matters 
here, however, is that the decline visible in the early 1980s was not 
dramatic and did not lead to levels of support below those observed ten 
years earlier. 
To sum up briefty the results presented so far: If one looks at a few 
key survey items on defense policy for which longitudinally compara-
ble data are available, dramatic discontinuities in aggregate West Ger-
man public opinion between the l 970s and the l 980s cannot be dis· 
cemed. lnstead, we observe a remarkable degree of stability-apart 
from a few outliers in our time series (like threat perception in 1980) 
that can plausibly be accounted for. Tobe sure, this statement refers to 
the West German public in total, whereas the "successor generation'' 
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Fipare J. Attitudes on American Troops and Gennan NATO 
Membership, 1970-1984. 
Pavor U.S. Withdrawa/: Perccntage rcplying "wcJcome" in rcsponsc to the ques-
tion „lf you would read in the ncwspapers tomorrow that thc Americans withdraw 
their troops from Europe, would you wclcome or regrct that?" Sourct: Rattinger and 
Hcinlcin, 1986: table 12; data from lfD. 
G~rman NATO Mtmbtrship: Percentagc in favor ofthe Western alliancc in response 
to the question "ln your opinion, what would be the bettcr policy, should we continuc 
our firm military alliance with the Amcricans, or should we attempt tobe neutral, likc 
Switzerland, e.g. ?" Sourct: Rattinger and Hcinlein, 1986: table 17; data from EMNIO, 
lfD, SINUS. 
hypothesis talks about the dramatic break away from prior attitude 
pattems as being concentrated among younger cohorts. 
However, even such a crude analysis indicates that there might be 
some problems with this hypothesis if applied to the public at large. 
Over the fifteen years that the data in Figures 1 through 4 describe, 
considerable generational replacement bad to take place, but the trends 
in the time series simply do not show that the opinions commonly 
ascribed to the new generations have become more frequent. On the 
contrary, these trends point instead in the opposite direction, even 
though these generations' share of the samples has become bigger each 
year. If one tries to save the argument by claiming that the new at-
titude pattems have lain donnant, in spite of generational replace-
ment, until polarized debates set in after the NATO decision of 1979, 
there still is little evidence, because this would have to manifest itself 
in clear-cut shifts in aggregate public opinion in the early I980s. Such 
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Flpe 4. Attitudes on the Possibility of Defense and the 
lmportance of Armed Forces. 1970-1984. 
Dtftnst Possiblt': Perccntagc_ replying „strong enouah" jn response to thc question 
"Assuming that the Russians and the National Pcople's Army of the GOR would at-
tack us. do you believe that NATO, includina the Bundeswehr [i.c., thc FRG's anny), 
would be strons cnough to protcct us cff cctivcly. or do you think that thc Russians 
would overwhelm us?" Souru: Raningcr and HeinJein, 1986: table 23; data from 
EMNIO, lf 0, SOWI. 
Bundtswthr (vtry) lmportont: Percentage rcplying „important" or „very imponant„ 
to thc qucstion „In our times and with the current situation of the world, do you be· 
lievc that the Bundeswehr is very important, important, not that imponant, unimpor· 
tant, superfluous, or danacrous?" Souru: Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: tablc 30; data 
from SOWI, FederaJ Ministry of Oefense. 
shifts, however, cannot be discemed. With this initial doubt in mind, 
let us now have a closer look at whether age really was the crucial 
dividing line along which national security attitudes in the Federal 
Rcpublic have lined up in the past couple of years. 
Generational Replacement or Partisan Polarization? 
Table 1 represents the polarii.ation of 16 different defense policy at-
titude items from summer 1981 to summer 1983 according to age and 
partisan preference of the respondents. Since these items came from 
many different surveys and the data wcre taken from published mate-
rial, the delineation of age cohorts was not the same in all cases. For all 
Tale 1. Polarization of National Security Attitudes by Age and 
Party Preference 
Extreme 
Perc:cntaae Perc:cntage 
in Any Age amona 
Group Party 
Voters 
30 40 Dif- Dif-
and and fer- Green CDU/ fer-
Question (Mont.h/Y ear) Below Above ence Party CSU ence 
1. There is a miliwy threat to 44 47 3 46 77 31 
FRO (.5183) 
2. FRG should accepa lhe neutron 26 31 .5 10 42 32 
bomb (8181) 
3. Agreement wilh INF deploy- 18 23 .5 3 3.S 32 
ment in respondent's area (6183) 
4. Opposition ap.inst INF in FRO S9 .51 8 73 40 33 
(2/83) 
.S. FRG should accept U .S. 26 35 9 21 39 18 
leadership (.5182) 
6. IMtente should be continued 71 61 10 84 .S2 32 
(3/82) 
7. FRO should leave NATO under 74 84 10 .S8 87 29 
no cin::umstances (3182) 
8. NATO is necessary for FRO 82 93 II 56 96 40 
(.S/83) 
9. FRO-U.S. relations are „aood" 49 62 13 44 61 17 
(8182) 
10. Agree wilh production of 29 42 13 13 S4 41 
neutron bomb (8181) 
11. lf Oeneva talks fail, continue 86 72 14 96 62 34 
talks and do not deploy INF 
(7183) 
12. Peace in Europe has become S7 72 l.S 73 27 46 
less secure in previous year 
(.5183) 
13. Warsaw Pact is militarily 3S .S2 17 24 .S2 28 
superior (.S/83) 
14. Nuclear weapons are unaccept- 6S 38 27 85 33 52 
able for Christians (4183) 
1.5. Would participate in prolest 27 0 27 49 2 47 
demonstntions in case of INF 
deployment (8183) 
16. Peace movcment is necessary 69 3.S 34 93 3.S 58 
for FRO (5183) 
Mean 14 36 
Souaa.s: All questions excepa nos. 6, 7, and 1 S were asked by Forschungs81'\Jppe 
Wahlen (FOW), and published in its "Politbarometer" repons. Questions 6 and 7 
c:ome from CONTEST-CENSUS in Frankfun, and no. l.S was asked by EMNID. 
Complete question wordings, response distributions, and breakdowns by aae. sex, 
etc., can be round in these institutes' repons, or in Ratlinaer and Heinlein, 1986: 
tables 107-122. 
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items, therefore. thc two age cohorts below 30 years and above 40 
years that were widest apart in their responses were identified (first and 
second columns of Table 1). The difference in their opinions (third 
column of Table l) is the maximum polarization between any two age 
groups, and the rows of Table 1 have been ordered with increasing 
magnitude of this difference. The maximum distances of opinion ac-
cording to partisan preference without exception occurred between 
those who intended to vote for the CDU/CSU, and for the Green party. 
respectively, so columns four through six of Table 1 describe attitudes 
of these two partisan groups and their polarization. 
The "successor generation" in the early 1980s clearly differed from 
older West Germans in its opinions on national security. On all sixteen 
items the extreme value for younger people shows them to be more 
antimilitary, anti-U.S., and anti-NATO. However, most ofthese differ-
ences are far from being dramatic, especially if one considers the way 
they were computed, i.e., searching for the maximum polariz.ation be-
tween any younger and any older cohort. Moreover, only for four 
items (9, 13, 14, 16) is the majority reversed, and only for two of these 
items (14 and 16) is this reversal very strong: While about two-thirds of 
the respondents in the extreme cohort below 30 years held nuclear 
weapons to be basically unacceptable for Christians, and the peace 
movement to be necessary for the Federal Republic, only slightly 
above one-third of those in the extreme cohort over 40 years shared 
these views. With an average difference of 14 percentage points, the 
polarii.ation according to age rcally does not support the notion of a 
radical break of the views of the "successor generation" from those of 
older Germans, even on such issues as the neutron bomb (ERW), 
NATO membership, or IN F deployment. lt is undoubtedly true that 
most antimilitary and anti-U.S. activists of the early 1980s have been 
younger people, but the reverse, that the young tend tobe antimilitary 
and anti-U.S. activists, simply is not supported by the available data. 
As can be seen in Table 1, public opinion on each item tended to be 
polarized much more strongly along partisan lines. With an average 
difference of 36 percentage points between sympathizers of the Green 
party and of the CDU/CSU, the former conform much more closely to 
the notions often advanced about the „successor generation" as a 
whole. Polarization along both criteria is least dissimilar for percep-
tions of the military balance, and for opinions on U.S.-West German 
relations (items 13, 5, and 9), and it is much more pronounced along 
partisan than along generationaJ divides for all items relating to INF 
deployment, ERWs, detente, and threat perception. For eight items 
there is a reversal of majority between adherents of the Green party 
and of the CDU/CSU. In four cases this reversal is only moderate 
(items I, 9, 10, 13), but for the other four items (4, 12, 14, 16) compara-
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tively small minorities within one group correspond to outspoken ma-
jorities within the other group, and vice versa. However, even in spite 
of this rather significant extent of partisan polarization, majorities of 
both groups agree on such issues as support of German membership in 
NATO, skepticism about American leadership, the necessity to con-
tinuc detente, and on preferring further disarmament talks over lNF 
deployment. 
The question now, of course, is what this all means in terms of 
the ''successor generation" hypothcsis. First, it is obvious that the 
wholcsale departure from prcvious attitude patterns regarding national 
sccurity issues is not characteristic of youth as a whole, but mostly of 
those younger people who sympathize with the Green party. In the 
1987 Bundestaa elections the Green vote in the 18-24 (25-34) age 
bracket was 1S.S% (17.4%), so even cquating the Green electorate with 
the better-educated segments of the younger cohorts would be a gross 
exaggeration. And even the Green electorate itself with its strong bias 
toward youth is quite far from being a monolithicaJly antimilitary, anti-
NATO, anti-U.S. bloc, as Table l shows. Younger people outside the 
Green electorate show little resemblance with the "successor genera-
tion" stereotype. 
Second, the fact that the covariation of national security opinions is 
so much stronger with party preference than with age forces us to 
rcthink the problem of causality. Between partisan preferences and 
attitudcs on specific political issues a variety of causal pattems is con· 
ceivablc. At the one extreme you have those who intend to vote for a 
particular party bccausc it is closest to them on thc issues that they 
judge most salient. At the other extreme are those who like a particular 
party best for a variety of other reasons and for the sake of consistency 
accept this party's positions in areas that are less salient for them. 
Regarding different politicaJ problems one and the same individual can 
easily fall into both groups. In the Federal Republic there is, of course, 
another political issue area that heavily, if not primarily, mobilizes 
Green support, namely, environmental problems. The fact that even 
the comparatively strongly mobilized Green electorate is far from 
monolithic in its defense policy opinions demonstrates that it is possi-
ble for Green voters to disagree with "their" party in this issue area. lt 
is therefore equaUy possible that some of those who toe the party 1ine 
in these opinions do not do so because these are the attitudes that tie 
them to this party, but simply because they support its proclaimed 
stand in most ongoing politicaJ debates, even if they do not center 
around the issues that have constituted the initial allegiance. 
Such an interpretation of elite-mass interactions is much broader 
than the "successor generation" hypothesis, indeed comprises it as a 
special case. lt is possible that societal con.ftict and elite political de-
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bates are brought about by the polarization of mass attitudes due to 
generational replacement, but it is equally possible that polarization at 
the mass level in part results from polarization of elite conftict over 
particular issues. In the short run, both processes might look very 
similar at the aggregate JeveJ, but they should differ considerably in 
terms of long-run consequences. Generational replacement is a slow 
historical process that cannot be halted and can be only slowly 
counteracted by life cycle effects. Polarization along party lines both at 
the elite and at the mass level, on the other band, can come about quite 
quickly, with the issues of the day, relevant issue publics, and dividing 
lines more or less in ftux. 
From the data presented so far it seems saf e to conclude that the 
"successor generation" hypothesis can hardly be proclaimed as the 
clear-cut winner. This becomes even more obvious if one considers the 
changes of def ense policy attitudes that could be observed in the ear)y 
1980s for adherents of even the two major established parties of the 
Federal RepubJic, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, changes that to a con-
siderable degree occurred irrespective of age. For reasons of space it is 
impossible here to trace at any length how the SPD's electorate fol-
lowed the party's withdrawal from support ofNATO's J979decision; it 
happened gradually at first and then quite rapidly after the overthrow 
of the Schmidt govemment in late 1982. Only a small but impressive 
example of the direct impact of partisan attitudes on national security 
opinions wm be presented. 
From 1981through1984 „Forschungsgruppe Wahlen" in Mannheim 
regularly polled whether peace in Europe was evaluated as having 
become more or less secure over the past year. In the total population, 
perceptions of peace as having become Jess secure fell between 1981 
and 1984 from 67% to 27% (1982, 57%; 1983, 37%), while perceptions 
of no change or greater stability of peace increased from 33% to 73%. 
Whether this trend signaJs either the dissolution of earlier alannist 
notions or evaluations that things were already so bad they couldn 't get 
worse is irrelevant here. All we are concerned with is the breakdown of 
this trend according to party preference for the CDU/CSU or all other 
parties combined, presented in Figure 5. 
In 1982 CDU/CSU voters were exactly like the rest; in 1981 they bad 
been somewhat more pessimistic. In 1983, however, their pessimism 
regarding the stability of peace dropped by more than 30 percentage 
points and then paralleled the general downward trend, but at a much 
lower levet. On the whole, within these three years pessimism among 
CDU/CSU voters feil by almost 60 percentage points, among all others 
by less than 30. The reason for this phenomenal short·tenn develop-
ment clearly is the change in govemment. With "their" party in power, 
most Christian Democratic voters simply accepted the new govem-
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ment's position that there was no reason to worry about the stability 
of peace in Europe, even with Western lNF deployment imminent. 
Neither the strong aggregate short-term downward trcnd of pessimism 
(that was evident even among Green voters whose pessimism fell from 
82% to 63% between 1981 and 1984) nor its clear-cut differentiation 
aJong partisan lines can be made to square with generational explana-
tions. lnstead, we see that even "cognitions" of factual conditions in 
the „real wortd•' of security policy can change quickly and dramat-
ically according to partisan attitudes. 
Attitudes, Nonattitudes, and Information on National 
Security 
Up to hcre it has (implicitly) been assumed that people who are being 
polled for their opinions on defense poJicy actually do have such at-
titudes, and that these attitudes can be adequately measured. As long 
as one onJy wants to follow trends of response distributions over time 
or to compare them between subsamples, as has been done so far, this 
assumption does not pose much of a problem-at least as Jong as one is 
willing to additionally assume that those without attitudes believe the 
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same and that distortions of measurement are the same all the time and 
within all subsamples. However, when it comes to what poUing is all 
about for most of its consumers, i.e., to say what public attitudes really 
look like and how they are distributed, things are far more compli-
cated. In this final section this problem will be approached in three 
steps: First, we will have a closer look at the range of survey results 
that were obtained on the double-track decision and its implementation 
in the Federal Republic. Assuming that the variations that can be ob-
served might have something to do with the knowledge people have 
about these things, some data on levels of relevant information will 
then be presented. Third, and finally, we will briefly report some meth-
odological experiments to test the impact of question formats and 
wordings on national security opinions. 
The major survey research institutes in the Federal Republic did not 
conduct such experiments of their own in the early 1980s. They were 
too busy trying to find out what people really thought about the NATO 
decision and INF deployment. In doing so a whole variety of questions 
on this subject were asked, sometimes almost exactly at tbe same time, 
and a variety of contradictory findings were reported-and greedily 
absorbed into tbe political debates. In that way, however, a large-scalc 
experiment was conducted involuntarily. 
Table 2 contains results from eight different questions on the double-
track decision and INF deployment that were asked between only one 
to eight different times between January 1981 and October 1983 by 
various institutes. For all these questions except one, a high proportion 
of refusals (between one-fourth and one-third) to choose from the 
closed-ended responses is visible. This exception is whether INF 
should be deployed after the scheduled date if no success were to 
emerge from the Geneva talks, a question that also produced the larg-
est antideployment majority. Opposition still greatly outnumbers fa-
vorable responses for the next two questions, but with the invocation 
of Soviet SS-20s targeted on Western Europe in the fourth question the 
gap begins to close. Questions 3 and S are particularly interesting be-
cause they form the only genuine split-half experimental design. The 
third question was put to a subsample in October 1981 without ex-
plaining the number of SS-20 warheads targeted on Western Europe 
and the fact that there were no comparable weapons in the West. Not 
surprisingly, there is a reversaJ of the majority between the two ques-
tion fonnats; given this prior information in question 5 more respon-
dents favored deployment than opposed it. In spite of this experiment, 
the version containing this information was continued and the other 
was not. 
Even though there is no reference to new nuclear weapons in ques-
tion 6, at that time it had to become interpreted in tenns of imminent 
Table 1. Attitudes on INF Deployment and the Double-Track 
Decision, 1981-1983 
Attitudes on INF and 
NATO's Double-Track 
Decision 
No. Dates Percent 
of of Percent Percent Oon't Know, 
Question Surveys Surveys Favorable Opposed Undecided 
J 6 S-9183 24(25) 72(75) 4 
2 4 5181-1182 28(38) 45(62) 27 
3 1 10/81 28(39) 44(61) 28 
4 2 8-10/83 34(44) 43(56) 23 
s 4 1181-4182 38(52) 35(48) 27 
6 s 7181-4182 40(61) 26(39) 34 
7 J 8/83 46(68) 22(32) 32 
8 8 5181-8183 51(70) 22(30) 27 
Mean 37(49) 39(51) 24 
NOTE: Numbers in parenthcses are pen;entages without „don't know" or ··undc-
cided." 
QuES110Ns: 1. lf thc Ocncva talks fail to yield an agreemcnt untit fall. what should 
be done? Deploy INF (with or without continuina negotiations) vs. continue talks 
without deployment. (FGW. Jnstitut mr angewandte Sozialwissenschaft in Bad Godes-
berg (INFASJ; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: tablcs 81-83) 
2. NATO plans to deploy American INP in Europe, andin the FRG, to balancc 
Soviel INF. Do you welcome this or not? (UD; Rattingcr and Hcinlcin, 1986: table 
49) 
3. Do you favor deployment of new nuclear missiles, that can ruch the Soviet 
Union, in the FRG or not? (United States International Communications Agency 
[USICA); Rattinger and Hcinlein, 1986: tabJc .52) 
4. lf the Gcncva talks fail to yield an agrecment untiJ fall and the Soviel Union 
kceps its SS 20 missiles targctcd on Western Europe, should new Amcrican INF be 
deployed in the FRO according to the doublc-track dec.ision or not? (IID; Rauinger 
and HeinJein, 1986: tablc 84) 
S. Question as in 3. with previous infonnation: As you might know. the Russians 
bave about 4~ nuclear warheads on new missiles, the SS 20s, targeted on Western 
Europe. whercas NATO does not have such missiles thal are targeted on the Soviel 
Union. In view of this fact •... 1 (USICA; Rattinger and Heinlein. 1986: table 51) 
6. Do you believe that nuclear wcapons in Europc hclp prevcnt a Soviet auack. or 
do you think that they malte a Soviet attack morc likely? (USICA; Rauinaer and 
Heinlein, 1986: table S6) 
7. Assuming we can only choose betwecn leaving NATO or dcploying the new 
American missilcs in the FRG, what should we do? (lfO; Raninger and Hcinlein, 
1986: table 85) 
8. ln the double-track decision NATO nations have agreed to baJancc Soviet INF 
by deploying similar missiJes in Ccntral Europe whilc initiatina neaotiations with the 
Soviet Union on the rcduction of armaments. Do you think that this double-track de-
cision is good or not good? (lfO; Rattingcr and HeinJein, 1986: tablc 47) 
West German Attltudes on Securlty 511 
INF deployment. Precisely because there is no such reference, favor-
able responses exceed opposition, but there is a great deal of insecu-
rity. Question 7 shows how people can be pushed into favoring INF, 
even though new deployment in the Federal Republic is explicitly men-
tioned, by posing withdrawal from NATO as the alternative. Question 
8, finally, by focusing on the NATO decision and mentioning its inten-
tion to negotiate arms reductions, produces the highest share of favor-
able responses. Thus, in the early 1980s a wide range of results of 
surveys on this topic was available to choose from. Depending on 
one's predilections one could claim either that only one-fourth or that 
more than half of the West German population agreed with the Decem-
ber 1979 decision and its implications. lf, as is often done, don't knows 
and undecided respondents are excluded, one could describe about 
70% as either in favor or opposed, depending on the survey results 
utilized. 
Logically this does not make sense, of course. However, as soon as 
one allows the possibility that many respondents reply to such ques-
tions without these matters being of much personal salience and with-
out a great deal of relevant information or experience, these seeming 
inconsistencies are not at all surprising. As the problem of personal 
salience of national security issues has been dealt with at great length 
elsewhere (Rattinger, 1985; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986), it should 
suffice here to simply recall the low importance ascribed to the preser-
vation of peace as a political problem for the Federal Republic (Fig. 1), 
or to consider the high proportion of undecided respondents in Table 2. 
lf low personal salience and low information are combined, we come 
into segrnents of opinion where so-called nonattitudes (Converse, 
1970) increasingly play a role. Under such conditions survey responses 
are still made (if only to please the interviewer), but they are not a 
reliable and valid measure of the attitude to be assessed, because such 
an attitude barely exists. lnstead, responses will be influenced by a 
multitude of other factors, like contextual information, question word-
ing, and affects vis·l-vis the actors that are being referred to, etc. 
Within this realm of nonattitudes, many "logically" incompatible re-
sponses make perfect sense, even for one and the same individual. This 
"logic" of choosing whatever "feels best" in a given situation presup-
poses, of course, that there is little knowledge of the relevant facts and 
of strategic intricacies. Let us, therefore, now briefly turn to the ques-
tion of how much people know about these things. 
As Table 3 shows, the range of statements on people's infonnation 
on the double-track decision and related matters that could be sup-
ported by data is even wider than for opinions on these things them-
selves. However, it does not take too close a look to discover that 
actually those questions that show large proportions of respondents as 
Table J. Information About INF, the Double-Track Decision, and 
the Geneva Talks, 1981-1983 
Percent Percent 
Percent Not Don•t 
No. lnfonned, lnformcd, Know, 
of Dates of Correct Wrong No 
Qucstion Surveys Surveys Ans wer Answer Ans wer 
1 1 12/81 86(86) 14(14) 0 
2 1 2/83 83(83) 17(17) 0 
3 3 5/81-8/83 75(77) 22(23) 3 
4 1 8/83 67(67) 33(33) 0 
Mean "soft" items (1-4) 77(78) 22(22) 1 
s 1 2/82 55(83) 11(17) 34 
6 1 2183 27(49) 28(51) 4S 
7 1 9183 20(20) 78(80) 2 
8 1 3181 15(2S) 46(75) 39 
9 2 .5-7/81 10(18) 46(82) 44 
Mean "hard" itcms (5-9) 23(35) 43(6.5) 34 
Mean all items 50(60) 33(40) 17 
Non:: Numbers in parencheses are percentaaes withouc "don't know" or "no an-
swer. •• 
QuESTioNs: 1. In Geneva, Americans and Russians have recenlly staned negotia-
tions on disarmamcnt. Have you hcard about this or not? (IID; Rattinger and Hein-
lein, 1986: tablc 39) 
2. In the contcxl of lhe Gcneva disannament negoliacions, you increasinaly hear 
about the so-c:allcd zcro option. This means ... texplanation). Have you hcard about 
thc zero option? (lfD; Rattinser and Hcinlein, 1986: tablc 41) 
3. In December 1979 NATO has aareed upon the so-callcd doubte-track decision, in 
ordcr to ... (explanalionl. Have you heard or read aboul lhis decision? <EMNID, 
INFAS; Rattingcr and Hcinlein, 1986: tables 32-33) 
4. In the FRG American Pershing 1 missiles have becn dcployed now for an cx-
tended period of time. Did you know this? (lfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: labte 
43) 
S. Do you know whether or not the U.S. and the Soviel Union currcntly ncgotiace 
aboul limitations of INF in Europe? (USICA; Rattingcr and Heinlein. t986: labte 40) 
6. Do you happen to know who proposed the zero option, the Germans. thc Ameri-
c:ans, or the Russians? (lfD; Rattinger and Heinlein. 1986: cablc 42) 
7. Assuming new INF will be stationed according to the double-1rack decision: Will 
this increase or dccrease ehe numbcr of nuclear warheads in the FRG. or will 1t re-
main thc same? (EMNID; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: labte 44) 
8. lf you hear or read ehe word "NATO-Nachrüstung" li.e .• INF deploymcnt ac-
cording to lhc double-track decisionl. can you teil me whal this mcans? (lfD. opcn-
ended; Rattin1cr and Heinlein, 1986: tablc 3.S) 
9. In your opinion, whal is NATO's double·track dccision about? (INf AS. opcn-
cnded; Ra\linaer and Hcinlein. 1986: table 34) 
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correctly infonned have to be classified as very "soft." In items 1 
through 4 the existence of the Geneva talks, the zero option, the dou-
bJe-track decision, and the presence of Pershing 1 missiles in the Fed-
eral Republic were mentioned and even partially explained. Only then 
were people asked whether they had previousJy been aware of all of 
this. With a question formal like this the only surprising thing is that 
the percentages claiming to have been aware are not even higher. One-
third of respondents admitting to not having known about the Pershing 
I missiles is an admirable degree of honesty, but most likeJy still falJs 
considerably short of the actual amount of ignorance. 
As one proceeds to the "hard" knowledge items (those that do not 
supply what they ask for) refusals soar to one-third of sarnples and well 
above. Question 5 is not yet completely "hard, „ as the way it is asked 
suggests that there are such negotiations. Moreover, had each of the 
respondents who have not admitted ignorance simply ftipped an honest 
coin, 33% of the total sample still would have given a correct answer. 
Similarly, for questions 6 and 7, regarding who proposed the zero 
option and on the number of nuclear warheads in the Federal Republic 
after deployment of new INF, the percentages of correct responses 
have to be set against the proportions that would be obtained by ran-
dom guessing. For question 6, with three alternatives provided, this 
percentage would be 18, so there is a surplus of only 9 percentage 
points of the total sample being correctly informed over random expec-
tation; for question 5 this surplus iS 22 percentage points. 
Question 7 is fascinating. Because it proceeds from the assumption 
of new INF deployment, respondents are very confident that they can 
reply (onJy two percent "don't know"), and they overwhelmingly state 
that the number of warheads would go up, an answer that is indeed 
suggested to the nonexpert by the question. However, the double-track 
decision actually called for more old warheads to be withdrawn than 
new ones deployed, so "decrease" would have been the correct an-
swer. Not surprisingly, this was chosen by virtually no one. If one 
therefore also classifies „remain the same" (meaning no increase) as 
correct, as has been done in Table 3, one sees that an honest coin 
would have led to „correct" responses for an additional 29% of the 
totaJ sample. The actual level of infonnation falls considerably short of 
random expectation, so it is fair to say that very few people really knew 
what would happen to the number of nuclear warheads in the Federal 
Republic. 
The open-ended questions 8 and 9 show that correcting for random 
responses in the previous questions does bring us closer to an adequate 
assessment of the level of infonnation in the population at large. With 
40% or more "don't knows," only 15% and 10% of total samples in 
1981 could adequately characterize the meaning of "Nachrüstung" and 
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the contents of the double-track decision, respcctively.3 With such a 
low level of knowledge we can safely conclude that a considerable 
number of nonattitudes will certainly be obtained when questions like 
the ones in Table 2 are asked on these matters. 
In order to get a better understanding of the effects that variations of 
survey instruments can have under such conditions of low personal 
salience of, and low information on, the subject matter tobe surveyed, 
a series of experiments with a smaJI sample of local students were 
pelfonned in summerof 19854 (see Schumanand Presser, 1981, forthe 
logic and many results of such studies). As we briefly report some 
resuJts from this study, it should be understood that, if anything, we 
are going to underestimate the impact of different question formats, 
because students generally are better informed about defcnse policy 
than the rest of the population and ascribe greater personal importance 
to this policy arena. The experiments on which we will report here fall 
into three classes. First, we investigatc the eft'ects of omitting or ex-
plicitly offering "don't know" alternatives or neutral "middle" re-
sponses. Second, the eff ects of minor variations of question wording 
are assesscd. Third, we will have .a look at the impact of reversing 
question order. 
Explicitly offering "don't know0 or '"middle" response categories 
or not is a purely formal device on which different survey research 
institutes have very different philosophies. Table 4 demonstrates that 
SU\.:h rcsponses are seldom volunteered but are quite popular when 
they are pennitted, and that the amount of uncertainty among respon-
dents varies considerably between items. However, that can only be 
detected if such answers are explicitly allowed. Only then does it be-
come visible, for example, that uncertainty about Soviel trustwor-
3. The distinction between ··correct" and "wrong" was made by the author on the basis 
or the grouped responses reportcd by the survey inslitutes. The criteria for being "cor-
rect„ were rather mild ones: For question no. 8. ali responscs refening to ncw or modern 
weapons for NATO were reprded as correct (even without reference to nucl~ar 
weapons, or to missiles to bc stationed in Eur~); for question no. 9 all responses 
referring to simu/1aneous negotiations and preparat.ions for depJoyment of new weapons 
were classified as comct. 
4. In June 198S 90 studcnts of the University of Bambera were interviewed for their 
atlitudes on nuclear weapons and national sccurity with a standardiud questionnaire (32 
items) wilhin a split-half desip. Interviews Jasted about 25 minutes. on tbc avcrage. All 
of approx.imately 120 students from one panicular donn (housing students from all 
schools or tbe university) were tobe interviewed within two days; 30 of them could not 
be contacted or refused to participatc. Interviewers were studcnts f rom a class on na-
tional security policy and its social conte.xt the author tauaht in summcr 1985 (in the U .S. 
system it woutd have been called a graduale coursc). Randomization of forms was 
achieved by tossina coins; 47 rcspondcnts were thus interviewcd wilh the standard 
quesüonnaire, 43 with the experimental questionnaire (in Tables 4-7 these are referred to 
as versions A and B. respectively). Conc:emina thc relative positions of one pair of 
questions in the interview a split-four design was used (see notc to Table 6). l thank all 
students who were involved for their interest and their contnl>ution. 
Table 4. Split-Half Experiments on Students' National Security 
Attitudes with Explicit "Don't Know" and "Middle" Categories 
Perccnl Per· 
Percenl Percenl "Conser· ccnt 
"LibcraJ" Middle vativc" Don't 
Question Form Response Response Response Know 
1. Acccptance of nuclcar A 90 .s .s 
deterrencc B 8.S .s 10 
2. Should FRG become neuU'al A 60 35 s 
8 40 42 18„ 
3. Frecdom or peace more A 58 3.5 7 
importanl B S4 28 1s• 
'· Can Soviets bc trusted to A .s.s 38 7 
bonor treaties B 33 34 33••• 
Mean questions 1-4 A 66 28 6 
B .53 27 20 
.S. Acccpl membcr of Green A 60 7 23 10 
pany as defense minislcr B .so IS 30 .s 
6. More or less military A 8.S 12 3 0 
expenditures for FRG B 63 28„ 7 2 
7. Possibillty of miliwy A 30 0 63 7 
defense of FRG B 20 42••• 38 0 
8. Acceptancc of U.S. troops in A 5' 25 20 0 
town B 38 .s.s••• 7 0 
Mean questions .S-8 A 58 11 27 4 
B 43 3.S 21 1 
NoTES: Qutstionnai" form A: "Don't know" (qucstions 1-4) or "middle" c:ateaory 
(questions .S-8) not oft"ered (N • 47). Qutslionnoirt form 8: "Don't know" or "mid· 
die" catcaory offcred (N • 43). Sipificancc mcasurcs arc bascd on a one·tailcd Z-
test for diß'erencc of proportions of "don't know" or ••middle" responses. 
QuunoNs: 1. Can you accept the notion that lhe national security of lhe FederaJ 
Republic is based upon a c:onccpt of nuc:lear dctemncc, or can't you accept this no-
tion (or don•t you havc an opinion)? 
2. What ltind of foreip policy should the FcdcraJ Republic pursue: Should we c:on-
tinue our miUt.ary alliance with lhe Amcricans, or should we try to bc neutral, like 
Switzertand, e.a. (or don't you have an opinion)? 
3. Nobody knows what is goin1 to happen, but what do you think: lf some day we 
miaht bc faced with the choic:e to sumnder Europe to the Soviets or to defcnd our-
selves with all the means we have, what would bc morc imponant, to defend demo-
c:ntic freedom, even if this mcans war, or to prevent war, even if this means livina 
under a communist aovemment (or don't you k.now)? 
4. Do you think that the Soviel Union can bc trusted 10 honor the treaties it has 
concluded wilh the Fcdenl Republic and with the Western powers, or don'I you think 
it can bc trusled (or don't you have an opinion)? 
.S. Could you ac:ccpl a member of the Oreen party u de(cnse minister, (would you 
care aboul lhis at all,) or couJdn't you accept that? 
6. Do you think that in the futurc the Fcdenl Govemment should spend more, (tbe 
cumnt amount,) or less on military defense? 
7. Assumina the FcderaJ Republic would bc ataacked by the East, do you think 
NATO couJd defend apinst such an attack, (do you lhink succcssful defense would 
bc uncertain,) or do you believe thal defense would 001 bc possible? 
8. Do you like the idea that U.S. troops are stationed herein town, (do you care 
aboul lhis at all,) or don't you like it? 
•p < .1. ••p < .05. •••p < .01. 
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thiness is much stronger than about the desirability of West German 
neutrality, or that indifference is the most frequent rcaction to U .S. 
troops in town. 
In the second group of experiments it was attempted to push respon-
dents in the experimental group even further into the antimilitary and 
anti-U.S. camp (already quite popular with students, of course) by 
small modifications of qucstion wording. Table S shows considerable 
success in this regard. Reminding people of conditions in the GOR and 
of a possiblc risk that assisting West Germany and Berlin might pose to 
the U nited States wcre least effective in reducing enthusiasm about a 
military person as dcfense minister or trust in U .S. security guaran-
tees, respectively. The tiny word "even" (sogar), tied to the use of 
nuclcar weapons for military defense of the Fedcral Republic, made 
quite a difference in terms of support for this course of action. Defining 
the same time period for comparison of judgments on the quality of 
West German-American relations either by the number of years or by 
reference to the tenure of President Reagan in office dramatically re-
versed majority judgment bctween the two groups. In these exper-
iments we also see that variations of questions wording can either 
increase or dccrease respondents' insecurity. Questions 2 and 4 are 
examplcs of the former, 1 and 3 of the latter. The Reagan question in 
particular illustrates what "nonattitudes" on foreign and defense pol-
icy mean, cven with a student sample: How can the average person 
make ajudgment of changes in relations between the United States and 
the Federal Republic? As soon as a clue is offered that evokes well-
defined affective connotations (like the U.S. president does for many 
students), such judgments are made more readily and in line with the 
clue. 
The experiments finally to be described on question order cffects go 
far beyond what generally is done in analyzing survey data. lf a defense 
policy item is not completely isolated in an interview, the rest deaJing 
with other subjects, it is conceivable that responses to former ques-
tions shape later answers as much as nuances of question design do. 
This is not necessarily an indication of nonattitudes but can also reflect 
different interpretations of question meaning due to context. The two 
questions in Table 6 obviously evoke some kind of reciprocity norm 
and therefore are expected to be particularly subject to such transfer 
effects, and indeed, they are clearly visible. In the aggregate, in the 
student sample 10% more replied that the Soviel Union should with-
draw INF from the GOR to further d~tente than said the sarne thing for 
American INF in the Federal Republic. However, for both supcrpow-
ers there was morc agreement with this demand when this question 
followed second, and, as expected, this transfer effect was strongest 
when the two items immediately followed each other. In the USSR-
West German Attltudes on Securlty 
Table S. Split-Half Experiments on Studcnts' National Security 
Attitudes with Variations of Question Wording 
517 
Pro-U.S., Anti-U.S., Don't 
Question Form Promilitary Antimilitary Know 
1. Soldier as def ense minister A 18 75 7 
B 7 90•• 3 
2. Defense with nuclear A 25 15 0 
wcapons 8 2 ss• 10 
3. Quality of U.S.-FRG A 48 37 l.S 
relations B 30 65··· .s 
4. Trust in U.S. assistance A 15 15 10 
B 61 26• 13 
Mean (B version minus A version) -17 l7 0 
QuE.STioNs: lA. Should the FRO's defcnse ministcr be a soldier? 
18. In the GOR thc defense minister nonnally is a soldier. Should the FRG's ... ? 
2A. Do you favor military defense of the FRG, if nuclear weapons have tobe uscd 
for that purpose? 
28. Do you favor military defense of the FRG, even ("sogar") if ... ? 
3A. Have U.S.-FRG relations improved or deteriorated over the past fivc years? 
38. Have U .S.-FRG relations improved or deteriorated since President Reagan 
came into officc? 
4A. Oo you believe that the U.S. would assist the FRG and West Berlin in crisis 
situations? 
48. Do you believe ... , or don't you believe that thc U.S. would take that risk? 
*p < .1. ••p < .OS. •••p < .01. 
U.S. sequencc 70% (Soviel withdrawal) and 80% (U.S. withdrawal) 
agreement were obtained, respectively; in the reverse order these per-
centages are 90% (Soviel withdrawaJ) and 60% (U .S. withdrawal). Sub-
stantively, and politically, these are very different messages: 10% more 
for United States than for Soviel Union withdrawal in one case, 30% 
less in the other. We know, however, that this difference is simply the 
product of a small modi.fication in method. 
In Table 7 we do not have two '"symmetrical" questions, but rather 
questions reflecting two different cognitive representations of the Fed-
eral Republic's security environment. We sec that, in the aggregate, 
there was no transfer from perceptions of the military baJance to judg-
ments on whether the Federal Republic could be subjected to political 
pressure by the Soviel Union due to its military potential. When the 
order is reversed, however, such effects are obvious, response insecu-
rity and perceptions of Eastem superiority declining strongly after peo-
ple have made their judgment on the possibility of political blackmail. 
lt is interesting to note that these effects are minimal for the one-third 
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Tüle o. Split-Half Experiment with Variations of Question Order: 
Students' Attitudes on INF Withdrawal 
Agreement 
(Form) 
Question 
Asked 
First 
Asked 
Second 
Questions Separated by Eight Other ltems (N = 45) 
Soviet Union should withdraw INF from GOR 74 (A) 
U .S. should withdraw INF from FRG 74 (B) 
90(8) 
n(A) 
Questions lmmediately Following Each Other {N = 4S) 
Soviet Union should withdraw INF from GDR 70 (A) 
U .S. should withdraw INF from FRG 60 (8) 
Total (N = 90) 
Soviet Union should withdraw INF from GOR 72 (A) 
U.S. should withdraw INF from FRG 67 (8) 
90 {8) 
80(A) 
90(8) 
76 (A) 
Transfer 
Effect 
(Second 
minus 
First) 
QuESTioNs: In order to get ditentc in Europe going apin, it is necessary that the 
Soviel Union (U.S.) statts to withdraw its theatcr nuclear weapons (i.c., INF] from 
the GOR (FRG). Do you agree or not? 
In the standanl questionnaire A the USSR question was askcd first; in thc cxpcri· 
mental qucstionna.ire B the U .S. question was askcd first. For thcse two questions 
there were two versions of each questionnaire with different distances betwcen thcsc 
two questions. Form A was uscd for 24 respondcnts with thesc two questions im-
mediatcly following each other, and for 23 rtspondents with eiaht items scparatina 
thcm; for fonn 8 thcsc numbcrs were 21 and 22, respcctivcly. 
•p < .1. „P < .OS. 
of students that see the Federal Republic subject to Soviel pressure, 
whereas among the other two-thirds, who first reject such a possibility, 
there is then a quite massive need to bring the second answer in line 
with the first one, resulting in a substantial drop of "don't knows" and 
''perceptions'' of Warsaw Pact superiority. H even students, with their 
comparatively good knowledge of defense policy and with above aver-
age personal salience of these matters, can react so strongly to the 
context of questions in their responses to basic perceptual items, it is 
not hard to imagine that what is published as survey results on national 
Ta~le 7. Split-HaJf Experiment with Variations of Question Order: 
Students' Attitudes on the Military Balance and Its Political 
lmportance 
Asked Asked 
Qucstion Response First Second 
Total (N = 90) 
Can FRG be Yes 37 36 
blackmailed by No 63 64 
Soviel Union (N = 43) (N = 47) 
Who is strongcr Warsaw Pact 35 20 
in militarY power NATO 23 35 
Both cqual 17 33 
Don't know 25 12 
(N = 47) (N !:!!! 43) 
FRG Can Be Blackmailed (N == 33) 
Who is strongcr Warsaw Pact 21 26 
in military power NATO 24 20 
Both equal 30 27 
Don't know 25 27 
(N = 16) (N === 17) 
FRG Cannot Be Blackmailcd (N = 57) 
Who is stronger Warsaw Pact 44 16 
in military power NATO 22 44 
Both equaJ 9 37 
Don't know 25 3 
(N = 27) (N = 30) 
Transfer 
Effect 
(Second 
minus 
Firsl) 
- 1 
1 
-1s• 
12 
16•• 
-13· 
5 
- 4 
- 3 
2 
-28•• 
22„ 
28··· 
-22•„ 
QuESTJoNs: In your opinion, can the Soviel Union use its military potential ror polit· 
ical blackmail or the FRG? 
Considering lhe military batancc between NATO and thc Warsaw Pact, who is 
stronaer? 
In the standard qucstionnaire A the question on the military baJance was asked 
first; in the experimental questionnaire 8 the question on the possibility of blackmail 
was asked first. 
•p < .1. „p < .o.s. •••p < .01. 
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security public op1mon at large frequently will have come about 
through similar, and possibly even stronger, processes and distortions. 
But all we usually get to know is response distributions; most of the 
time their background remains obscure. 
Conclusion 
The thrust of this article is largely nihilistic. We have shown that asser-
tions about public opinion on defense policy in the Federal Republic 
having been transformed radically since the December 1979 NATO 
decision and thus having become a key factor requiring major policy 
changes in order to regain societal consensus are grossly overstated. 
We have also shown that normal partisan strife is at least as important 
as the notion of generational succession for explaining the polarization 
of mass opinions that has occurred. Finally, we have argued that, in 
spite of the importance public opinion surveys were ascribed in the 
political battles of the first half ofthis decade, there is little evidence of 
a rapid increase of relevant knowledge in the population at large and 
little certainty as to what its positions on the implementation of the 
double-track decision really looked like. lnstead, a large amount of 
volatility of public opinion on these matters due to the pervasiveness of 
nonattitudes has to be acknowledged, even for the alleged core of 
"new realities" in the social context of defense policy, i.e., the young 
and better educated. The public's views in the Federal Republic on 
national security and nuclear weapons since 1979 have been important 
and interesting, and they deserve further study, but the joyful or alarm-
ist diagnosis of a sudden "revolt of the masses," led by an emergent 
"successor generation," falls short of the complex realities that still 
need tobe understood more adequately. 
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